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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
(

STATE OF UTAH
000O000

VICKIE BURROW,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
Case No.

vs.

88-0098CA

MARK VRONTIKIS,
Defendant and
Respondent.
-000O000-

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On the 5th day of January, 1988, Judge J. Dennis Frederick, District Court
Judge for the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah entered an Order that the Plaintiff's claim for support for the minor child
prior to the date of the filing of Plaintiffs paternity action was barred by the
doctrine of laches and/or equitable estoppel.
Plaintiff /Appellant filed a timely Notice of Appeal from said Order and the
jurisdiction is properly before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S78-2a3(2)(h).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. May the Appellants now object to the Court's reliance upon the Utah
Supreme Court case of Borland

v. Chandler,

733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) with

respect to the instant case.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2.

Is there a factual basis for the trial court's determination that the

doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel apply in the instant action.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. ORDINANCES.
RULES AND REGULATIONS
78-45a-l. Obligations of the father.
The father of a child which is or may be born out of
wedlock is liable to the same extent as the father of a
child born in wedlock, whether or not the child is born
alive, for the reasonable expense of the mother's
pregnancy and confinement and for the education,
necessary support and funeral expenses of the child. A
child b o m out of wedlock includes a child born to a
married woman by a man other than her husband
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed an action in p a t e r n i t y based upon Utah Code Ann.
S78-45a-l £JL seq.

D e f e n d a n t a d m i t t e d p a t e r n i t y but argued that any

payments for support prior to the filing of the Complaint in the instant case were
barred by the equitable doctrines of laches and/or estoppel. At the time of trial,
the Court entered an Order for ongoing support for the Plaintiff and provided for
back support distinguishing between that period prior to the filing of the action
and that period from the filing of the action to the date of trial. The Court ruled
that although the Plaintiff had engaged in conduct which may have met the
definitions of laches a n d / o r e s t o p p e l that it was b a r r e d by the then
present

case law from

considering

the effect

of such conduct.

A

$7,200.00 j u d g m e n t thus arose in favor of the Plaintiff and against the
Defendant for support prior to the filing of the paternity action.
The Defendant appealed arguing that the case of Zito v. Butler,

584 P.2d

868 (Utah 1978) was bad law to the extent that it denied the application of the
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equitable doctrines of laches and estoppels in statutory case. After briefing and
prior to argument, the Utah Supreme Court decided the case of Borland
Chandler,

v.

733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987) specifically confirming the position asserted

by the Defendant. On the basis of the Borland

case, this Court reversed the

previous judgment and remanded the matter to the Third Judicial District Court
for reconsideration of the issues of equitable estoppel and laches.
Upon remand, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing at which both
Plaintiff and Defendant testified and testimony was taken from a mutual friend
who had interacted with both of the parties during that period. Based upon the
testimony received at the hearing, the Trial Court determined that the Plaintiff's
claim for support prior to the filing of the paternity action was barred by the
doctrines of laches and/or equitable estoppel. (Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law attached hereto). From that Order Plaintiffs have appealed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant dated as high school students in the early part of
1976. While neither party considered the relationship "serious" it resulted in the
unanticipated and unwelcome pregnancy of the Plaintiff. (TR. 3) *
Plaintiff and Defendant met to discuss the dilemma.

That meeting was

unsatisfactory from the point of view of the Plaintiff causing her to feel "rejected"
and "hurt". (TR. 7) No agreement was reached between the parties at that time
and there was no further direct contact between Plaintiff and Defendant until

1. All references in the Statement of Facts are to the reporters transcript of proceeding conducted
before the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick on Monday, December 7, 1987.
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some seven years later when the Plaintiff filed the instant action. (TR. 4, 7)
Plaintiff determined that she would have the child and raise the child
herself independent of any interaction or role on the part of the Defendant. (TR.
7,8)
The parties had a mutual friend by the name of William Snape who testified
at the hearing. The Plaintiff indicated to Mr. Snape that after her meeting with
Mr. Vrontikis, she under no uncertain terms wanted anything to do with Vrontikis;
did not want to see him again; and wanted to handle the matter herself. (TR. 31)
The Plaintiff knew that Mr. Snape was in contact with Mr. Vrontikis and Mr.
Snape believed that she anticipated and desired that he pass that information to
Mr. Vrontikis so that Mr. Vrontikis would leave her alone. (TR. 32) Mr. Snape
communicated this information to Mr, Vrontikis who complied.
Mr. Vrontikis, having received this information, respected her desires and
went on with planning his life not participating in the raising of this child,
marrying, raising a family of his own and making financial commitments. (TR. 23,
24, 25) This continued for seven years until the Plaintiff decided she needed
financial assistance and commenced the instant action claiming not only future
support, but reimbursement for past support. (TR. 14, 15, 16)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The effect of the Utah Supreme Court decision in Borland,

supra is to

allow the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel to be applied with equal force
and effect in paternity actions as in other domestic cases.
2. The Trial Court properly found that the Plaintiffs claim for back support
was barred by the equitable doctrines of laches and/or estoppel. The Trial Court
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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findings that the Plaintiff desired that there be no contact between her and the
Defendant following the birth of the child, that she would raise the child
independent of any role on the part of the Defendant including his assistance, that
she expressed this desire to a third party who she knew to be in communications
with the Defendant. And that she knew or should have known that her statements
would be communicated to the Defendant. That he reasonably relied upon those
statements are sufficient for application of laches and estoppel.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
EQUITABLE ARGUMENTS ARE AVAILABLE DEFENSES IN
PATERNITY ACTIONS.
Appellant argues in her second point that this Court should limit the effect
of Borland

v. Chandler,

supra, overruling the earlier incorrect doctrine of Zito

v. Butler, supra, only to the extent that a Defendant has been prejudiced at trial.
Clearly, Borland

stands for the principle of equal application of equitable

doctrine, including the full effect of laches and estoppel in paternity actions, just
as previously available in other domestic matter:
The principle relied upon by the Plaintiffs has its roots
in the common law distinction between law and equity.
At common law, an equitable defense could not be
raised to a legal action, and because a statutory action
was legal in nature, equitable defenses would not apply.
See Am. Jur. 2d equity 8154 (1966). This seems to be
the theory behind Zito,
a per curiam opinion.
However, Utah long ago abolished any formal
distinction between law and equity. See Utah R.Civ.
P.2. It is well established that equitable defenses may
be applied in actions at law and that principles of
equity apply wherever necessary to prevent injustice.
(Citations omitted). Therefore, it is clear that under
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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appropriate circumstances, laches may bar an action
for paternity. Even the majority opinion in Nielsen ex
rel. Department
of Social Services v. Hansen. 564
P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1977), cited by Zito recognizes
in dictum that laches might apply in a paternity action.
Therefore, we conclude that to the extent that Zito
stands for the proposition that an equitable defense is
not available, it is an incorrect statement of law and is
over-ruled.
(footnote omitted).
Borland
v.
Chandler, 733 P.2d. Id. at 146.
Thus, the argument advanced by Appellants herein is inconsistent with the
clear intent of the Court. The principles of Zito were incorrect at the time the
per curiam decision was announced. It was only a matter of time until the Court
corrected the problem and restated the basic principle of law. Equitable defenses
are available and may be raised by Defendants in all actions where they apply
whether the action arises at common law or as a creature of statute.
Additionally, Appellant should be barred from challenging the effect of
Borland

in this case, at this time, in that this Court has already relied upon the

decision in Borland

v. Chandler

to reverse and remand for consideration of the

defenses of laches and estoppel which set the stage for the Trial Court ruling with
which Appellant now takes issue. Plaintiff/Appellant took no exception to this
Courts ruling at that time and is now bound by that position. The Trial Court
properly followed the mandate of this Court and considered equitable defenses in
this action.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHIN ITS DISCRETION TO
FIND A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE
DOCTRINES OF LACHES A N D / O R ESTOPPEL.
Appellants primary point is not founded in law but rather disputes the
Findings of Fact issued by the Trial Court. It is a well settled standard of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a

appellate review that the trial court's determination of facts is entitled to
considerable deference and should be disturbed only when necessary to prevent
manifest injustice. Jackson

v. Jackson,

617 P.2d 338, 140 (Utah 1980). The

standard for review is that the Court should not disturb the Findings of Fact made
below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous or against the weight of the
evidence. Dang v. Cox Corporation,
v. McBride,

655 P.2d 658, 660 (Utah, 1982);

581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). See also State

McBride

v. Gabaldon,

735

P.2d 410 (Utah App. 1987); Wood v. Weenig, 736 P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987).
There is a distinction between current and future support due a child and a
. parents claim for reimbursement for past support provided. Baggs v.

Anderson,

528 P.2d 141 (1974). Thus th claim for reimbursement of support is open to
challenge based upon the conduct of the party making the claim. Larsen
Larsen,

v.

300 P.2d 596 (1956). These claims may be raised in equity and turn on

the facts as decided by the fact finder. Borland

v. Chandler,

supifl.

Defendant raised two defenses in equity, laches and estoppel. While these
are similar and are often confused, the elements are somewhat different.
Utah Supreme Court discussed the differences and the elements for each in
Leaver

v. Grose, 610 P.2d 1262 (1980) as follows:
The availability of the defense of laches in contingent
upon th establishment of two elements: (1) the lack of
diligence on the part of the Plaintiff; and (2) an injury to
Defendant owing to such lack of diligence (footnote
omitted).
The doctrine of estoppel has application when one, by
his acts, representations, or conduct or by his silence
when he ought to speak, induces another to believe
certain facts exist and such other relies thereon to his
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

detriment, (footnote omitted) id. at 1264.
The Trial Court found from the evidence that these doctrines were
applicable in the instant case.
A. Laches.
The Plaintiff in the instant matter had a potential remedy at law available
for financial assistance from the father of her child. That cause of action would
allow for determination of paternity and establishment of a obligation for support
at a sum certain. Utah Code Ann. S78-45a-l et, sec^. The Plaintiff decided not to
pursue that cause of action and not to attempt to avail herself of that potential
remedy for a period of seven years. This clearly constitutes a lack of diligence but
is further aggravated in this case because it was motivated by a willingness to
forgo the potential benefit in order to avoid what would come with that benefit,
i.e. the involvement of the father in the life of his child and accordingly in the life
of the Plaintiff and the Defendant by this action was injured. Seven years passed
before he knew for sure that he had a child; a child who had never seen him nor
had any opportunity to interact with him, creating substantial damage to any
potential relationship. Having no knowledge of the obligation, he did not plan in
any way to provide care for this unknown child during Ithat period but rather
committed his resources and made his financial planning based upon those factors
known and at hand. *
1. In obligation founded upon a decree of divorce, a clearly defined legal obligation exists. The
Defendant knows both the amount and the nature of the obligation, there is nothing uncertain in its
scope. If based upon hearing nothing from the Plaintiff in such a case he decides to take no action, he
places himself at some peril. In a case of a potential claim in paternity, the Defendant has much more
limited rights with respect to the child and until some claim is asserted may not even know if he is the
father of the child. Accordingly, there may be no duty or there may be a duty in an amount yet to be
ascertained.
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BL Estoppel.
The doctrine of estoppel is also applicable in this matter.

Estoppel differs

from laches in that it is not just the lack of due diligence resulting in injury but "is
a doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their rights where their actions
or conduct render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights." Hunter
Hunter

v.

669 P.2d 430, 432 (1983).
Plaintiff has relied upon the case of Adams

v. Adams,

593 P.2d 147

(1979) for the principle that "mere silence on the part of the Plaintiff is not
sufficient to raise an estoppel". Id- at 148. This principle of course, is correct
where there is no duty to speak. The finding in the instant case, of course, was not
based upon mere silence but included specifically a finding that representations
Plaintiff made to Mr. Snape were relayed to the Defendant and that he reasonably
relied upon those communications. In Adams,

the Court specifically found that

there was no showing of a representation either "explicit" or "implicit" upon which
the Defendant in that case relied.

In fact, Adams

of support, it had been established by decree.

knew that he had a duty

He claimed estoppel merely

because Mrs. Adams had taken no action during a five and one-half year period to
enforce her Court Ordered rights.. * Accordingly, in Adams

there is no act,

representation, or conduct that could be relied upon by the Defendant to support
his claim of equitable estoppel and the Adams Court properly rejected estoppel.

1. Adams did not raise and does not consider whether laches would have applied under the facts
circumstances of that case. It is probable however, that the Defendant in Adams would have run
afoul of the second principle of laches as the Court found that he had not "changed his position to his
detriment" A dams v. Adam s, 593 P.2d at 148.
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There is no requirement at law that the act, representation or conduct be
made in the presence of, or directly to the party relying upon it, merely that said
act be done in a fashion reasonably likely to result in its communication to the
third party and the resulting harm.
In the instant case, the Plaintiff told Mr. Snape that she wanted no
involvement with the Defendant, that she did not want him to participate in any
fashion with the raising of the child. This in fact was her posture and position as
stated during her own testimony, one which she did not change until the filing of
the action. 1
The second case relied upon by Plaintiffs is Hunter
supra. Hunter
In Hunter,

v.

Hunter,

also examines a defense founded in estoppel and finds it wanting.

the Plaintiff went into hiding with the child and concealed her

whereabouts from the Defendant. The Defendant claimed that this was sufficient
action to justify the application of the doctrine. He further stated that he had
some misunderstandings partially derived from communications with his
probation officer and the Department of Social Services that he would not be
required to pay child support, id. at 432. It is significant in Hunter

that the

Court disregarded the communications Mr. Hunter had with his probation officer
and the Department of Social Services because they did not "involve actions or

1. As noted in her testimony, her motivation in bringing the action in June of 1983 was that she was
then separated from her current husband and had a present desire for financial support for the child.
This present and future desire was fully met. (TR. 16) The trial court found that as a result of the
statements and acts communicated to Mr. Vrontikis by Mr. Snape, he directed his financial affairs and
his life in reliance upon not having a financial obligation to the Plaintiff. And clearly as found by the
trial court he would be injured if now forced to go back and borrow money to pay the Plaintiff for the
period of time for which she had no desire to have financial assistance and for which he made no plan.
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conduct by the appellant". Id. at 432. The Court also found that the Plaintiffs
actions in going into hiding were justified by her fear of the Defendant and on the
basis of previous violent experiences with him. Id. at 433. Thus, a party may not
rely upon the statements of third parties to support his claim for equitable
estoppel unless he can show that those statements are based upon and related to
acts, representations or conduct of the party against whom the estoppel will be
applied. In the instant case it is the acts and representations of the Plaintiff which
are communicated to the Defendant through Mr. Snape and upon which he relies
to his detriment that the Trial Court relied upon to establish the factual basis for
the application of the doctrine of estoppel.
Implicit in the statements of the Plaintiff that she desired to be left alone
and did not want any contact or involvement with the Defendant is the message
that she is not looking to him for any assistance either as a father or financial
supporter of the child in question. In Wasescha

v. Wasescha,

548 P.2d 895

(1976) the Court found the Plaintiff communication to the Defendant that he was
"to leave her and her family situation alone for the time being" sufficient conduct
to serve as the basis for estoppel with respect to past obligations of support. Id. at
896. The Defendant conformed his financial planning for these seven years to his
understanding that he had no role and no obligation with respect to this child. To
suddenly have to come up with four years of support payments that were never
budgeted, planned for or known about presents a clear hardship much greater
than would have an ongoing obligation.
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CONCLUSION
The Trial Court was clearly within its discretion to determine that the delay
of the Plaintiff, her actions reasonably led to a reliance by the Defendant to his
detriment and in applying the equitable doctrines to this instant case.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $J

day of September, 1988.

^j^jT' '/Z^-n
JEROME H.MOONEY
Attorney for Defendant/Respondent
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